看到美國紐約州和新澤西州州長宣布進入颶風緊急狀態，趕緊上NRC網站，搜到了2014年1月6日PSEG公司應對2012年颶風桑迪的一個經驗反饋PPT。
從該PPT中我們可以看到：
1、核電廠實際上做了非常周密的針對異常和極端天氣情況下的設計以及應急準備預案。
2、核電系統的經驗反饋和持續改進是核安全業績提升重要工具。核電行業是一個互相學習提升的行業。
3、核電行業是一個信息透明度非常高的行業。桑迪臺風之后，國內新聞當時對此不了解，報道了大量不屬實的信息，本人當時還專門針對此撰寫了一篇博文以澄清事實，詳見：http://blog.sina.com.cn/u/55e07e6401017ldt。
后附PSEG公司應對2012年颶風桑迪的一個經驗反饋PPT原文/譯文（初稿，未校正，歡迎拍磚指正），如下：
In the Eye of the Hurricane: Super Storm Sandy PSEG Nuclear Preparations, Impacts and Lessons Learned
題目：颶風眼中：超級臺風桑迪對PSEG公司核電準備、影響和經驗教訓
P1：Forecast vs. Actual
第一頁：預測和實際
•Forecasts on October 29th at 6 pm called for:
–Additional rainfall of another ¼ - ¾”
–Winds through midnight will be sustained at 30-45 mph with gusts of 45-65 mph
–Overnight winds will be sustained at 15-30 mph with gusts of 30-50 mph
–Storm surge will be 3-6’ and will peak around midnight. Storm surge should recede by mid morning
•10月29日6：:0預測為:
–額外降雨1/4-3/4英寸
–午夜風速將持續在30-45英里/小時、陣風45-65英里/小時
–整夜風速將持續在15-30英里/小時、陣風30-50英里/小時
–風暴潮將達到3-6'，午夜將達到頂峰。上午風暴潮將減弱
P2:Forecast vs. Actual
第二頁：預測和實際
•Actual weather from landfall at 8 pm through the early morning
–Rainfall was consistent with forecast
–Winds through the evening were 40-60 mph with gusts upon landfall of up to 90 mph
–Winds were sustained through the night precluding storm restoration to begin until 7 am
–Storm surge ranged from 11-13.6’, causing widespread flooding and devastation to the region
•從8:00登陸起早間實際天氣:
–降雨與預測一致
–整夜風速持續為40-60英里/小時、登陸時高達90英里/小時
–風持續了整夜直至7:00開始風暴恢復
–風暴潮達到11-13.6'，導致洪災泛濫。
P3：PSEG Nuclear Unit Status
第三頁：PSEG公司核電站狀態
•Hope Creek - 100% Rated Thermal Power
•Salem Unit 1- 100% Rated Thermal Power
•Salem Unit 2 (two days prior to Sandy’s arrival):
–Defueled, Full Core offload, in Spent Fuel Pool
–Defueled Mid Loop
–Single Source of Off-site power
–Major Equipment OOS
•2B Emergency Diesel Generator, 2B Vital Bus OOS
•2B 125V DC batteries
•21 SW Nuclear Header
•Hope Creek核電站——100%額定（熱）功率
•Salem核電站#1機組——100%額定（熱）功率
•Salem核電站#2機組（在桑迪到達前兩天）
–卸料狀態，全部堆芯卸出，裝在乏燃料池內
–卸料中間回路
–僅依靠外電源（本人批注：柴油機應該是在檢修狀態）
–主設備00S
•2B應急柴油發電機，2B重要母線00s
•2B 125V直流蓄電池
•21 SW 核頂蓋
P4：Salem and Hope Creek Flood Design
第4頁：Salem和Hope Creek核電站防洪設計
（本人批注：上圖右邊標注了Salem和Hope Creek核電站的防洪設計情況，此兩個電站在同一廠址區域，詳細介紹見：http://blog.sina.com.cn/u/55e07e640101gszf 。場平標高100英尺，正常河水水位89英尺，歷史最高水位97.5英尺，設計洪水位按照120英尺考慮，Salem核電站的安全廠用水系統標高127英尺、柴油機入口126英尺；Hope Creek核電站的安全廠用水系統標高132英尺、柴油機入口132英尺；上圖左下角標注了1900年以來新澤西州颶風發生情況的統計，第一欄為等級、第二欄為風速、第三欄為發生次數，從該統計看到僅僅有一次一類颶風，世俗為74-95英里/小時）
P5：Salem and Hope Creek Shutdown Criteria
第五頁：Salem和Hope Creek核電站關停標準
•IF AT ANY TIME the river level is >98.5 ft, THEN INITIATE actions to place the Unit in Mode 3 within 6 hours and in Mode 5 within the next 30 hours.
•IF hurricane force winds are imminent, THEN INITIATE preparations such that the Unit is in Hot Standby (Mode 3) at least two hours prior to the projected arrival of hurricane force winds.
•一旦河水水位高于98.5英尺，就啟動相關行動，在6小時內將機組置于第3類模式，在接下來的30小時內置于第5類模式。
•如果颶風級風即將發生，即啟動相關準備（例如機組在預計颶風級別風抵達前至少2小時前將機組置于熱備用狀態（第3類模式））
P6：Salem and Hope Creek Emergency Action Levels (EALs)
第六頁：Salem和Hope Creek核電站應急等級（EALs）
•Unusual Event (UE)
–Delaware River level reaches 99.5 feet at Salem units, 99.5 feet at Hope Creek
–Average Wind Speed >95 mph for any elevation
•Alert – Escalation with UE conditions
–Visible damage to Safety Related Structures
•異常事件（UE）
–在Salem機組和Hope Creek機組位置的達拉維河水位達到99.5英尺；
–在任意海拔高度平均風速超過95英里/小時
•報警——擴大至UE條件
–安全相關建筑物可見損壞
P7：Implementation of Severe Weather Guidelines – Phase 1 (T-3)
第七頁：極端天氣導則的執行——第一階段（T-3）
•Operations
–Inspect station blackout equipment
–Verify remote shutdown panel communications
–Indication and switch alignment
–Hope Creek blockhouse sump pump staged
•運行
–檢查電站停電設備
–檢查遙控停機面板通訊
–指示燈和開關之列
–Hope Creek潛水泵準備好
P8：Implementation of Severe Weather Guidelines – Phase 1 (T-3)
第八頁：極端天氣導則的執行——第一階段（T-3）
•Maintenance
–Protect spare equipment required for recovery
–Inspect/remove/secure outside areas for potential missiles
–Staging of sump pumps and sandbags
–Availability of emergency supplies like flashlights, potable water, etc.
•維修
–準備好用于恢復的背影設備
–檢查/去除/加固室外區域潛在危險
–準備好潛水泵和沙包
–有效應急用品如防爆燈、飲用水等。
P9：Implementation of Severe Weather Guidelines - Phase 2 (T-2)
第九頁：極端天氣導則的執行——第二階段（T-2）
•Site walkdowns
•Verifying water tight doors
•Emergency diesel generator availability
•Return Major Plant Equipment for Shutdown Safety
•Ensuring water intakes prepared for severe weather
•Address potential staffing requirement
•廠址巡查
•檢查水閉門
•應急柴油機有效
•使得主要電廠設備安全停運
•確保用以極端天氣準備的取水
•員工潛在需求的服裝
P10：Staffing requirements
第十頁：員工需求
Only essential personnel req’d to report
–Specific responders from two ERO teams
–Operations Support Center (OSCs)
–Technical Support Center (TSC)
–Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
僅僅是需要報告的重要專業人員
–2個ERO（應急響應團隊）專門反饋
–運營支持中心（OSCs）
–技術支持中心（TSC）
–應急操作設備（EOF）
P11：Implementation of Severe Weather Guidelines - Phase 3 (T-0)
第十一頁：極端天氣導則的執行——第三階段（T-0）
–Close watertight doors
–Relocate personnel
–Implement preplanned sandbagging
–Relocate vehicles to shelter
–Establish Fire Protection command post
–Complete various Service Water Bay penetration repairs
–關閉水閉門
–安置人員
–執行事前計劃的壘沙袋工作
–重新安置汽車以防護
–建立消防指揮部
–完成各種防滲水修復工作
P12：Superstorm Sandy impacts
第十二頁：超強風暴桑迪的影響
•Hope Creek - Remained at 100%, HC output greater than demand on PJM
•Salem Unit 1 manually taken offline at 1:09 am (5 day forced outage)
–Four of the six circulating water pumps no longer available
–Heavy debris, waves resulted in Travelling water screens stopping
•Non-vital Switching Station lost due to water intrusion
–Loss of power to several buildings onsite
–Lost onsite intranet, phones, met tower data to Salem control rooms
•Hope Creek核電站——維持100%負荷，輸出功率大于PJM（本人批注：美國一區域電力市場）的需求
•Salem核電站#1機組于下午1:09手動解列（5天的強制檢修）
–6臺循環泵中的4臺不可用
–嚴重波浪，波浪導致進水閘門停用
•沒有重要開關站因水的入侵停用
–廠內幾座建筑物失電
–廠內網絡、電話故障，接觸塔數據到Salem控制室
P13：Staffing Requirements
第十三頁：員工需求
•Suspended Salem Unit 2 refueling outage activities on Sunday evening, October 28
–All equipment, except SW header, returned to Operations
–Reactor Cavity flooded up to Refueling level for defense in depth
–All contractors left site that weekend
–First time in operating history to suspended refueling outage
•10月28日、星期六晚上，推遲Salem#2機組的換料大修
–所用設備，除了SW頂蓋，重返運行；
–反應堆堆腔注水至換料水位用以縱深防御
–所用員工周末留在現場
–運行史上首次推遲換料大修
P14：Superstorm Sandy Lessons Learned
第十四頁：超級風暴桑迪的經驗教訓
•Equipment Issues / Storm Preparations
–Substation enclosures are susceptible to water intrusion
–Lack of outage contingencies for loss of building capabilities
–Lack of adequate sleeping arrangements for essential personnel.
–Access road monitoring and shoring – extra fill / seawall
•設備問題/風暴準備
–開關站圍墻易遭受水侵襲
–缺乏建筑物失電后的維修應變措施
–重要人員缺少額外睡眠的安排
–進城道路監護和支護——額外的填充/防波堤
P15：Lessons Learned – Root Cause
第十五頁：經驗教訓——根本原因
•Abnormal Procedure Guidance
–Inadequate severe weather guidance in Abnormal procedure for wind speed, direction, grassing levels, tide, etc.
–Decision Making on unit power did not account for wave action effects
–Severe Weather Guide – No single designated information source for decision-making
•異常情況程序指導
–在關于風速、風向、潮等異常情況程序中增加極端天氣（應對）導則
–關于機組功率的決策不要影響指揮行動
–極端天氣導則——沒有一個用于決策的設計信息源
P16：Lessons Learned – Corrective actions
第十六頁：經驗教訓——糾正行動
•Previous Shutdown Criteria
–IF AT ANY TIME river level is >98.5 ft…
•Maximum Tide was 97.2 feet
–IF hurricane force winds are imminent...
•Maximum average wind speed was 59 miles per hour
•Wind direction shifted 180° in four hours directed at CWIS
•事前停機標準
–一旦河水水位高于98.5英尺...
•最高潮位97.2英尺
–如果風暴潮即將到來...
•最大平均風速為59英里/小時
•風向在4小時內偏轉180度朝向CWIS
P17：Lessons Learned – Corrective actions
第十七頁：經驗教訓——糾正行動
•New Shutdown Criteria
–CW intake degradation index
•Uses grassing, tide, wind speed and direction
•Guidance to shutdown as a composite
–If hurricane is to pass within 50 miles of site - shutdown
•新停運標準
–冷卻水取水（安全）降級指引
•使用grassing（本人批注：專業詞匯，不會）、潮位、風速和方向
•作為一項綜合措施的停運導則
–如果颶風以時速50英里/小時的風速通過長治——（機組）停運
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