久久久精品区,九七电影韩国女主播在线观看,精品久久久久久亚洲国产300,国产亚洲综合在线,久久综合狠狠综合久久激情,日韩激情av在线,国产日韩电影,日韩黄色视屏,欧美乱大交xxxxx另类电影,欧美日韩免费不卡视频一区二区三区

印象中美國的核安全監管是非常到位的，但無憂科學家聯盟（http://www.ucsusa.org）作為獨立第三方持續多年對美國的核能安全和NRC的監管給予了高度的關注。2014年2月27日，他們按照自己的觀點對2013年美國核電站安全和NRC的監管給予了評判。本人試著翻譯一下摘要，以供大家參閱。

本人特別聲明：本人未獲無憂科學家聯盟網站的授權翻譯（也未進行校對），只是從科普志愿者的角度分享一種觀點，不用于商業用途，如有異議，本人將刪除相關博文；本人承諾不會應用于商業行為，也請轉載者承諾不用于商業行為。

本人聲明：本人未對UCS所闡述的案例做過仔細研究。該文只代表UCS的觀點而不代表譯者的觀點。

本人觀點：UCS利用核電行業公開披露的信息做出了相應的評價，在給予NRC工作充分肯定的同時對其不足給予了批評。這種批評也許存在于對事情的認識不一樣，也許是掌握的信息不一樣，也許是NRC和核電廠真實的不足，但質疑有助于核安全水平的提高！有專業素養的第三方參與對提升監管和核安全水平非常有幫助！信息的充分披露，第三方的獨立意見等都值得國內學習！

報告摘要原文地址：http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/NRC-Nuclear-Safety-Report-2013-summary.pdf

報告全文地址：http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/NRC-Nuclear-Safety-Report-2013.pdf

The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2013

——More Jekyll, Less Hyde

美國核管會和2013年核電廠的安全性

——多些Jekyll，少些Hyde

OUR FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT CARD

我們第四年度報告卡

前言

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is charged with enforcing safety regulations at U.S. nuclear power plants to protect the public from harm. To do this it must actively monitor reactors and aggressively engage with owners and workers when it does find safety violations.

美國核管理委員會（NRC）負責執行美國核電廠安全規制工作以保護公眾免受傷害。為此，必須主動監測反應堆，并且當發現違反安全規定時積極與業主和工人接觸。

The Union of Concerned Scientists has evaluated safety issues at U.S. nuclear power plants for more than 40 years. We have repeatedly found the NRC to be capable of enforcing its safety regulations—yet we have also repeatedly found its enforcement to be not timely, consistent, or effective.

無憂科學家聯盟（UCS）對美國核電廠的安全問題評估超過40年。我們發現NRC一直能夠執行其安全法規，然而我們也總是發現他們的執行不及時、不符合邏輯或效果不好。

This report, like its three predecessors, examines NRC actions during the previous year and chronicles what the commission did right and what it did wrong. Our goal is to help the NRC achieve more of the former and avoid more of the latter—before an avoidable accident costs American lives.

和前三分報告類似，本報告審查了NRC過去一年的行動，并記錄了NRC做對了什么、做錯了什么。我們的目標是幫助NRC在事故影響美國人生活成本之前實現事前（控制）并避免事后（惡果）。

Robert Louis Stevenson’s classic Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, first published in 1886, dealt with the split personality experienced by the friendly and mild-mannered Dr. Henry Jekyll and his alter ego, the evil Mr. Edward Hyde. Stevenson’s short novel is brought to mind by the apparent dual personality and bizarre behavior traits of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

羅伯特路易斯史蒂文森1886年首次出版的關于基爾醫生和海德先生的案例，闡述了友善且溫和、人格分裂的亨利杰基爾博士和他的另一面——邪惡的愛德華海德先生。史蒂文森的短篇小說帶給人們關注起美國核管理委員會（NRC）明顯的雙重性格和怪異的行為舉止。

On one hand, the NRC is a fair and effective regulator, establishing and enforcing safety regulations that subject neither nuclear plant owners to undue burdens nor workers and the public to undue risks. While no one can count the number of accidents that the NRC’s efforts have averted, the trend over the past three decades in the declining number of “near-misses” and safety problems is highly suggestive that much of the time the agency does its job well. On the other hand, the NRC sometimes acts as if it is channeling Mr. Hyde.

一方面，NRC是一個公平有效的監管者，建立和執行安全法規，既反對任何核電站承受不必要的負擔，也反對任何的工人和公眾承擔過度的風險。雖然沒有人能夠算清楚NRC的努力避免了多少事故，但過去三十年未遂事件和安全問題數量下降的趨勢高度說明了機構（NRC）大部分時間做得很好。另一方面，NRC行為有時又像海德先生一樣。

Inconsistencies in the NRC’s actions and inactions last year (2013) invoked both Jekyll and Hyde. As described in Chapter 2 of our report (online at www.ucsusa.org/nrc2013), the NRC’s inspectors repeatedly compelled the owner of the Columbia Generating Station to identify and correct the underlying causes of recurring problems with a vital air conditioning unit. But after identifying several examples of inadequate procedures and training at the LaSalle nuclear plant, the NRC’s inspectors let the owner off the hook entirely. Yet, when very similar problems surfaced at the H.B. Robinson and Browns Ferry nuclear plants, the NRC compelled the owners to rectify the deficiencies.

去年（2013）NRC的作為和不作為的不一致性讓人想起了基爾和海德。正如我們報告第2章描述（在www.ucsusa.org/nrc2013在線），NRC的監督員反復強調哥倫比亞發電站業主識別并糾正一個重要空調機組經常出的問題的根本原因。但在識別 LaSalle 核電廠程序不足和培訓的幾個例子后，NRC監督員讓業主完全脫離了“困境”。然而，當在 H.B. Robinson和 Browns Ferry核電站出現非常相似的問題時，NRC強迫業主糾正缺陷。

Note: AIT = augmented inspection team; SIT = special inspection team.

備注：AIT：擴大性檢查團隊；SIT：專項檢查團隊

The strange cases of the Fort Calhoun and Diablo Canyon nuclear plants provide further evidence of the NRC’s dichotomy. As described in Chapter 4, the NRC did not allow the Fort Calhoun reactor in Nebraska to operate until known safety shortcomings were corrected. Yet as described in Chapter 5, the NRC allowed the two reactors at the Diablo Canyon plant in California to continue operating despite its owner failing to resolve known safety shortcomings. The unresolved problems at Diablo Canyon involve inadequate protection against earthquakes. When similar earthquake protection deficiencies were identified at the Beaver Valley, Humboldt Bay, Maine Yankee, San Onofre, Surry, and West Valley nuclear facilities, the NRC’s Dr. Jekyll ordered them shut down until their owners had provided adequate protections against the earthquake hazards. Yet today, the NRC’s Mr. Hyde allows Diablo Canyon to operate despite the known risks.

Fort Calhoun和Diablo Canyon 核電站的奇怪案例為NRC的兩面性提供了進一步的證據。如第4章所述，NRC不允許內布拉斯加州的Fort Calhoun反應堆在確信安全問題得到糾正之前運行。然而，如第5章所述，NRC卻允許弗吉尼亞Diablo Canyon 核電站在業主未能解決已知安全問題之前繼續運行。Diablo Canyon未解決的問題涉及到關于地震的額外防護不足。同樣的地震防護不足也在Beaver Valley、Humboldt Bay、Maine Yankee、San Onofre、Surry和West Valley 核設施被發現。NRC的“Jekyll博士”要求在業主停堆直至提供了抵御地震災害足夠的防護。就在今天，NRC的“海德先生”卻明知風險的情況下允許Diablo Canyon 核電站運行。

Giving the NRC the benefit of doubt, one might assume there are nuances explaining why entirely opposite reactions to the same set of facts can somehow both be right. The strange case of Oconee clearly shows this is not the case.As described in Chapter 5, the NRC approved an amendment to the operating licenses for the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station in Seneca, South Carolina, in 2010 contingent on its owner completing safety fixes by December 31, 2012.

給NRC懷疑的好處，我們可以認為這里有細微差別來解釋為什么一種事實情況下有完全相反的反應。Oconee（核電站）的奇怪案例清楚地表明了情況并非如此。如第5章所述，2010年，在假定業主在2012年前完成安全問題糾正的前提下，NRC批復了南卡羅來納州塞內卡的Oconee核電站三座反應堆運行執照的修訂。

The owner asked the NRC in July 2012 for permission to extend this deadline by two years. In January 2013, the NRC’s Dr. Jekyll denied the request on the grounds that the risk was too high to allow the fixes to be delayed that long. But in July 2013, the NRC’s Mr. Hyde ordered the company to complete the fixes no later than November 15, 2016—nearly two years after the owner’s initial extension request that had been rejected as being too unsafe.

2012年7月，業主要求NRC同意該限期延長兩年。2013年1月，NRC的“Jekyll博士”因允許延遲太久、風險太高為由拒絕了此要求。但2013年7月，NRC的“海德先生”要求公司在不遲于2016年11月15日前完成整改——這一時間比當初因為不安全的原因被拒絕的業主初始延期申請還晚了近2年。

A second strange case of Oconee covered in Chapter 5 involved the NRC’s Dr. Jekyll formally requiring the plant’s owner in June 2010 to take more than a dozen measures to lessen the chances that the upstream Jocassee Dam (owned by the same company) could fail and to better protect the plant against flooding in the event the dam fails anyway. The NRC’s justification for this mandate included its determination that if the dam failed, there was a 100 percent chance that flooding would cause the three reactors at Oconee to melt down. The NRC’s Mr. Hyde then intervened to improperly with hold all the correspondence about this hazard from the public. Worse still, the NRC conducted its annual public meeting in the community near the Oconee nuclear plant in April 2011, a month after tsunami flooding caused three reactors at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station to melt down. The exact same flooding hazard that exists today at the Oconee nuclear plant was not mentioned by the NRC—so the public was actually misled into believing no such problems existed.

第5章提及的關于Oconee（核電站）第二個奇怪案例涉及到NRC的“Jekyll博士”2010年6月正式要求核電站業主為降低上游喬卡西大壩垮壩（與業主同屬一家公司）的概率，并在垮壩的情況下電站防御住洪水而采取數十項措施。NRC在此命令中的判斷（依據）包括它自己的判斷——如果垮壩，洪水將百分之百導致Oconee（核電站）三個反應堆熔堆。NRC的“海德先生”然后不當介入，阻止了應對公眾風險的一切措施。更糟的是，2011年4月，就在日本福島第一核電站因海嘯洪水導致三座反應堆熔堆事故后的一個月，NRC組織了Oconee核電站周邊社區的年度公眾會議。Oconee核電站現實存在的完全類似的洪災卻未被NRC提及——公眾被誤導而相信這樣的問題不存在。

To be sure, the NRC is far more Jekyll than Hyde, as evidenced by the improving trends over the past three decades. But with so many American lives at stake, even a cameo appearance by the NRC’s Mr. Hyde is too much. If an earthquake near Diablo Canyon or a failure of the Jocassee Dam harmed people, the NRC would be unable to look Americans in the eyes and honestly claim it had taken every reasonable measure to prevent the disaster.

可以肯定的是，NRC的“Jekyll”角色遠勝于“Hyde”角色，過去超過三十年持續改進的趨勢可以為此證明。但考慮到眾多美國人的危險境地，就算NRC客串一次“Hyde”也是太多了。如果Diablo Canyon附近發生地震或喬卡西大壩垮壩傷害了人民，NRC將沒有辦法面對美國人民并誠懇地宣稱它已就阻止災難發生做出不懈努力。
More Jekyll, less Hyde is this critic’s choice for the NRC’s future.

“多些Jekyll，少些Hyde”才是NRC未來的關鍵選擇。

Recommendations

建議
Chapter 2 summarizes near-misses that the NRC reported at U.S. nuclear plants last year. The lessons learned from the nearmisses described in Chapter 2 are:

第2章總結了NRC去年報告的美國核電站的未遂事件。第2章描述的未遂事件的教訓如下：
• The NRC and the nuclear industry should study the Arkansas Nuclear One near-miss to identify and institutionalize the elements that contributed to the successful response on the part of plant operators.

• NRC和核工業應該就ANO核電站未遂進行研究，以識別有助于部分電站操縱員成功應對的要素并制度化。
• The NRC should periodically re-inspect fixes to safety problems, such as those mandated by the agency’s generic communications program, to determine whether they continue to be effective.
• NRC應當定期對安全問題的整治進行復檢，例如通過機構通用通訊流程發布命令以判斷這些問題是否繼續存在。

• The NRC should revise its license renewal process to provide assurance that reactors are operating in a manner consistent with applicable regulatory requirements.

• NRC應修改其延壽許可程序以提供保障確保反應堆運行遵從所適用的規制要求。

• The NRC and the nuclear industry should protect against human performance impairment caused by fatigue at all times, not just when reactors are operating.

• NRC和核工業應當防止任何時候因疲勞而導致人為功能障礙，而不僅僅反應堆運行期間。

As Chapter 3 shows, such near-misses have been occurring at a rate of more than one per month over the past four years. Given enough chances, it seems only a matter of time before near-misses become an actual hit. Public safety would be better served by reducing the frequency of near-misses. The NRC should take two steps to better protect the public:

如第3章所述，在過去的4年每月有不止一件未遂事件發生。如果機會充足，未遂成為實際的重大打擊（事件）似乎只是時間問題。公眾安全依賴于降低未遂發生頻次。NRC應該在更好地保護公眾方面兩步走：
• Each special inspection team (SIT), augmented inspection team (AIT), and incident inspection team (IIT) should include a formal evaluation of the NRC’s baseline inspection effort. The baseline inspection effort covers the array of routine inspections conducted by the NRC at every nuclear plant. When an SIT, AIT, or IIT identifies safety violations that contributed to the near-miss, the NRC’s evaluation should determine whether the baseline inspection effort could have, and should have, found the safety violations sooner. Such insights from the near-misses may enable the NRC to make adjustments in what its inspectors examine, how they examine it, and how often they examine it to increase the chances of finding potential violations.

• 每一次專項檢查團隊（SIT）、擴大檢查團隊（AIT）和事故檢查團隊（IIT）都應該組織對NRC基線檢查的正常評估。基線檢查應覆蓋NRC在每座電站主導的常規監督。當一個SIT、AIT或IIT識別出造成未遂事件的違反安全（行為）時，NRC的評估應決定基線檢查是否可以有而且必須有，迅速找出違反安全（行為）。未遂事件的審查將使得NRC調整它們的監督員的檢查事項、檢查流程以及檢查頻度，從而增加發現潛在違規事件的機會。
• Plant owners must be required to formally evaluate why their routine testing and inspection regimes failed to find longstanding problems. Many of the near-misses in Chapter 2 involved design and operational problems that existed for years, sometimes decades. The testing and inspection regimes are intended to find and fix such problems preventively, but clearly failed to do so. Plants’ programmatic weaknesses must be remedied to offer better protection against future near-misses.

• 必須要求電廠業主正式評估為什么他們的常規試驗和監督制度不能找到長期存在問題。第2章中得多個未遂包括了存在多年（有的是數十年）的設計和運行問題。試驗和監督制度的目的就是用來發現并預防性修正這些問題，但顯然這一目的未實現。電站的程序性缺陷必須被糾正以更好地防止未來的未遂事件。

Note: AIT = augmented inspection team; SIT = special inspection team.

備注：AIT：擴大性檢查團隊；SIT：專項檢查團隊